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OF DONAHUE AND FIDUCIARY DUTY:
 
MUCH ADO ABOUT . . . ?
 
DOUGLAS K. MOLL* 
INTRODUCTION 
In the landmark decision of Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts discussed the dangers 
faced by minority shareholders in closely held corporations, as well 
as the obstacles that such shareholders encounter in challenging op­
pressive conduct under traditional corporate law1: 
Although the corporate form provides . . . advantages for the 
stockholders (limited liability, perpetuity, and so forth), it also 
supplies an opportunity for the majority stockholders to oppress 
or disadvantage minority stockholders.  The minority is vulnera­
ble to a variety of oppressive devices, termed “freeze-outs,” 
which the majority may employ.  An authoritative study of such 
“freeze-outs” enumerates some of the possibilities: “The squeez­
ers (those who employ the freeze-out techniques) may refuse to 
declare dividends; they may drain off the corporation’s earnings 
in the form of exorbitant salaries and bonuses to the majority 
shareholder-officers and perhaps to their relatives, or in the form 
of high rent by the corporation for property leased from majority 
shareholders . . . ; they may deprive minority shareholders of cor­
porate offices and of employment by the company; they may 
cause the corporation to sell its assets at an inadequate price to 
the majority shareholders . . . .”  In particular, the power of the 
board of directors, controlled by the majority, to declare or with­
hold dividends and to deny the minority employment is easily 
converted to a device to disadvantage minority stockholders. 
The minority can, of course, initiate suit against the majority 
and their directors.  Self-serving conduct by directors is pro­
scribed by the director’s fiduciary obligation to the corporation. 
However, in practice, the plaintiff will find difficulty in challeng­
ing dividend or employment policies.  Such policies are consid­
ered to be within the judgment of the directors . . . .  [G]enerally, 
* Beirne, Maynard & Parsons, L.L.P.  Professor of Law, University of Houston 
Law Center. 
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plaintiffs who seek judicial assistance against corporate dividend 
or employment policies do not prevail. 
Thus, when these types of “freeze-outs” are attempted by 
the majority stockholders, the minority stockholders, cut off from 
all corporation-related revenues, must either suffer their losses or 
seek a buyer for their shares . . . . [They] must liquidate [their] 
investment in the close corporation in order to reinvest the funds 
in income-producing enterprises. 
At this point, the true plight of the minority stockholder in a 
close corporation becomes manifest.  He cannot easily reclaim 
his capital.  In a large public corporation, the oppressed or dissi­
dent minority stockholder could sell his stock in order to extri­
cate some of his invested capital.  By definition, this market is not 
available for shares in the close corporation . . . . 
Thus, in a close corporation, the minority stockholders may 
be trapped in a disadvantageous situation.  No outsider would 
knowingly assume the position of the disadvantaged minority. 
The outsider would have the same difficulties. To cut losses, the 
minority stockholder may be compelled to deal with the majority. 
This is the capstone of the majority plan. Majority “freeze-out” 
schemes which withhold dividends are designed to compel the 
minority to relinquish stock at inadequate prices. When the mi­
nority stockholder agrees to sell out at less than fair value, the 
majority has won.2 
To protect against this potential for abuse, the Donahue court 
concluded that shareholders in closely held corporations owed a fi­
duciary duty of “utmost good faith and loyalty”3 to each other: 
Because of the fundamental resemblance of the close corpo­
ration to the partnership, the trust and confidence which are es­
sential to this scale and manner of enterprise, and the inherent 
danger to minority interests in the close corporation, we hold 
that stockholders in the close corporation owe one another sub­
stantially the same fiduciary duty in the operation of the enter­
prise that partners owe to one another.  In our previous 
decisions, we have defined the standard of duty owed by partners 
to one another as the “utmost good faith and loyalty.”  Stock­
holders in close corporations must discharge their management 
and stockholder responsibilities in conformity with this strict 
2. Id. at 513-15 (alterations in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting F.H. 
O’NEAL & J. DERWIN, EXPULSION OR  OPPRESSION OF  BUSINESS  ASSOCIATES: 
“SQUEEZE OUTS” 42 (1961)). 
3. Id. at 515 (quoting Cardullo v. Landau, 105 N.E.2d 843, 845 (Mass. 1952)) (in­
ternal quotation marks omitted). 
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good faith standard.  They may not act out of avarice, expediency 
or self-interest in derogation of their duty of loyalty to the other 
stockholders and to the corporation.4 
Donahue played a significant role in spawning a new era of 
judicial activity5 that focused on providing protection to minority 
shareholders in closely held corporations from abusive majority 
conduct. Donahue’s influence in this “movement” has been far-
reaching, as a number of courts outside of Massachusetts have also 
imposed a fiduciary duty between shareholders in closely held cor­
porations.6  Indeed, due in no small part to decisions like Donahue, 
most jurisdictions have gradually come to recognize that closely 
held corporations and their publicly held counterparts, as well as 
the expectations of the shareholders in those ventures, are suffi­
ciently distinct to warrant a different legal treatment.7 
Unquestionably, Donahue’s legacy stems primarily from its 
recognition of the dangers faced by minority shareholders in closely 
held corporations.  But did Donahue do more than simply call at­
tention to the plight of the minority shareholder—did Donahue 
change the law?  And if so, how?  After Donahue, in other words, 
4. Id. (footnote omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting Cardullo, 105 N.E.2d at 
845). 
5. That judicial activity was often aided by statute. As one authority observes, 
“Thirty-nine states have statutes providing for dissolution or other relief on the grounds 
of ‘oppressive actions’ (or similar term) by ‘directors or those in control.’” DOUGLAS 
K. MOLL & ROBERT A. RAGAZZO, THE  LAW OF  CLOSELY  HELD  CORPORATIONS 
§ 7.01[D][1][b], at 7-70 n.192 (2009) (citations omitted); see also id. at 7-163 to 7-181, 
fig. 7.1 (providing a fifty state chart on oppression statutes and their operative 
language). 
6. See, e.g., Georgeson v. DuPage Surgical Consultants, Ltd., No. 05 CV 1653, 
2007 WL 914219, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 2007); Guy v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 672 F. 
Supp. 1086, 1090 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Orchard v. Covelli, 590 F. Supp. 1548, 1556-59 (W.D. 
Pa. 1984); Melrose v. Capitol City Motor Lodge, Inc., 705 N.E.2d 985, 991 (Ind. 1998); 
Evans v. Blesi, 345 N.W.2d 775, 779 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Fought v. Morris, 543 So. 2d 
167, 170-71 (Miss. 1989); Whitehorn v. Whitehorn Farms, Inc., 195 P.3d 836, 843 (Mont. 
2008); I.P. Homeowners, Inc. v. Radtke, 558 N.W.2d 582, 589 (Neb. Ct. App. 1997); 
Walta v. Gallegos Law Firm, P.C., 40 P.3d 449, 456-57 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001); Crosby v. 
Beam, 548 N.E.2d 217, 220 (Ohio 1989); A. Teixeira & Co. v. Teixeira, 699 A.2d 1383, 
1386-88 (R.I. 1997); McLaughlin v. Schenck, 220 P.3d 146, 150, 156 (Utah 2009); Jorgen­
sen v. Water Works, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 98, 104-06 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998); see also Hollis v. 
Hill, 232 F.3d 460, 468 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting that “[Donahue’s] recognition of special 
rules of fiduciary duty applicable to close corporations has gained widespread accept­
ance”); Hoggett v. Brown, 971 S.W.2d 472, 488 n.13 (Tex. App. 1997) (noting that “a 
majority shareholder’s fiduciary duty ordinarily runs to the corporation,” but stating 
that “in certain limited circumstances, a majority shareholder who dominates control 
over the business may owe such a duty to the minority shareholder” (citations 
omitted)). 
7. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text. R 
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was the law of fiduciary duty in closely held corporations different 
from what it was before under traditional corporate law? 
The Donahue opinion itself suggests that it is changing the 
traditional law of fiduciary duty, as it contrasts the “strict good faith 
standard” that it announced with “the somewhat less stringent stan­
dard of fiduciary duty to which directors and stockholders of all 
corporations must adhere in the discharge of their corporate re­
sponsibilities.”8  Unfortunately, other than generally emphasizing 
that the Donahue duty is “strict,” “more rigorous,” and “more ex­
acting” than fiduciary duty under traditional corporate law,9 the 
Donahue opinion gives very little guidance on precisely what is dif­
ferent about the duty it articulates.  Similarly, it is not clear how 
those differences should affect a judicial inquiry beyond the vague 
notion that the analysis should be more rigorous.  Although the 
later Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc. decision refined the 
Donahue framework by introducing a legitimate business purpose 
inquiry, the Wilkes court largely reaffirmed the core fiduciary duty 
holding of Donahue without further elaborating on the differences 
between the Donahue duty and fiduciary duty generally.10 
This Article seeks to articulate precisely how Donahue and its 
progeny changed the law of fiduciary duty in closely held corpora­
tions.  Surprisingly, some of the changes that Donahue is credited 
with may not be changes in corporate law at all, while other 
changes suggested by Donahue (and acted on by later cases) de­
serve more attention. 
Part I argues that certain changes in the law that Donahue is 
credited with are not really changes at all. Traditional corporate 
law, in other words, already provides a shareholder-to-shareholder 
fiduciary duty, imposes that duty on the minority in certain circum­
stances, and regulates the disproportionate award of de facto divi­
dends.  Moreover, Donahue’s partnership analogy does not 
effectuate a change in the law, as neither Donahue nor traditional 
corporate law would allow partnership principles to apply in toto to 
closely held corporation disputes. 
Part II asserts that the real changes in the law brought about by 
Donahue are the protections provided to employment and manage­
ment rights even in the absence of de facto dividends, and the dilu­
8. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 515-16 (footnote omitted). 
9. Id. 
10. See Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 661-63 (Mass. 
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tion of business judgment rule deference in the closely held setting. 
Traditional corporate law does not consider employment and man­
agement interests to be part of one’s rights as a shareholder.  Fur­
ther, the business judgment rule ordinarily makes it especially 
difficult to challenge majority conduct that is harmful to those inter­
ests.  By providing protection to employment and management 
rights and significant scrutiny of majority decisions that affect those 
rights, Donahue and its progeny did change the law in ways that 
benefit minority investors in closely held corporations.11 
I. DONAHUE’S CHANGES: MUCH ADO ABOUT . . . NOTHING 
A. The Shareholder-to-Shareholder Fiduciary Duty 
To whom are fiduciary duties owed? Under traditional corpo­
rate law, fiduciary duties are conventionally viewed as running to 
11. In applying the fiduciary duty of utmost good faith and loyalty, the Donahue 
court also announced an accompanying “equal opportunity” rule: 
[I]f the stockholder whose shares were purchased was a member of the con­
trolling group, the controlling stockholders must cause the corporation to offer 
each stockholder an equal opportunity to sell a ratable number of his shares to 
the corporation at an identical price.  Purchase by the corporation confers sub­
stantial benefits on the members of the controlling group whose shares were 
purchased.  These benefits are not available to the minority stockholders if the 
corporation does not also offer them an opportunity to sell their shares. The 
controlling group may not, consistent with its strict duty to the minority, utilize 
its control of the corporation to obtain special advantages and disproportion­
ate benefit from its share ownership. 
Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 518 (footnote omitted). This Article does not consider the 
equal opportunity rule to be a change in the law because, soon after the Donahue opin­
ion was rendered, Massachusetts effectively abandoned the rule.  In Wilkes, the Massa­
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court reaffirmed the Donahue fiduciary duty, but scaled 
back the accompanying equal opportunity standard. See Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663.  In 
its place, the court articulated an oppression framework that effectively permits une­
qual treatment between controlling and minority shareholders so long as: (1) a legiti­
mate business purpose exists for such unequal treatment; and (2) there is no alternative 
course of action less harmful to the minority’s interest. See id.; see also Frank H. Eas­
terbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 
271, 296 (1986) (“The court in Wilkes inquired into the business purpose of the conduct 
at issue . . . .  Thus the court effectively repudiated the equal opportunity rule of Dona-
hue.”).  Moreover, a number of courts outside of Massachusetts have rejected the equal 
opportunity aspect of Donahue. See, e.g., Toner v. Baltimore Envelope Co., 498 A.2d 
642, 647-54 (Md. 1985); Delahoussaye v. Newhard, 785 S.W.2d 609, 611-12 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1990); see also Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1376 (Del. 1993) (“It is well 
established in our jurisprudence that stockholders need not always be treated equally 
for all purposes.”).  The language of some opinions, however, still seems to embrace the 
equal opportunity rule. See, e.g., Crosby, 548 N.E.2d at 221 (“Majority or controlling 
shareholders breach such fiduciary duty to minority shareholders when control of the 
close corporation is utilized to prevent the minority from having an equal opportunity 
in the corporation.” (citations omitted)). 
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the corporation (or to the shareholders collectively), but not to an 
individual shareholder.12  As a consequence, a minority shareholder 
can have difficulty challenging, for example, a termination of em­
ployment or a removal from management on traditional fiduciary 
duty grounds, as a court usually requires that harm to the corpora­
tion be shown, rather than harm merely to the minority share­
holder.13  By holding that shareholders in a closely held corporation 
“owe one another” a fiduciary duty, however, courts such as Dona-
hue change the principal focus of a fiduciary duty analysis to an 
individual shareholder.14  A plaintiff shareholder can emphasize the 
harm that he (rather than the corporation) has suffered, and the 
12. See, e.g., Gearhart Indus., Inc. v. Smith Int’l, Inc., 741 F.2d 707, 721 (5th Cir. 
1984) (observing that “directors’ duties of loyalty and care run to the corporation, not 
to individual shareholders or even to a majority of the shareholders”); Hoggett v. 
Brown, 971 S.W.2d 472, 488 (Tex. App. 1997) (“A director’s fiduciary duty runs only to 
the corporation, not to individual shareholders or even to a majority of the sharehold­
ers.”); id. at 488 n.13 (“We note that a majority shareholder’s fiduciary duty ordinarily 
runs to the corporation.”); Faour v. Faour, 789 S.W.2d 620, 621-22 (Tex. App. 1990) (“A 
corporate officer owes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders collectively, i.e. the corpora­
tion, but he does not occupy a fiduciary relationship with an individual shareholder, 
unless some contract or special relationship exists between them in addition to the cor­
porate relationship.”); McLaughlin v. Schenck, 220 P.3d 146, 153 (Utah 2009) (“Under 
the revised business code, directors and officers are required to carry out their corpo­
rate duties in good faith, with prudent care, and in the best interest of the corporation. 
These corporate duties have been interpreted to coincide with the common law under­
standing that officers and directors owe these duties to the corporation and sharehold­
ers collectively, not individually.” (citation omitted)); Lynch v. Patterson, 701 P.2d 1126, 
1136 (Wyo. 1985) (“The duty of the directors . . . is a duty to the corporation and not a 
duty to the stockholder instituting the action.”); J.A.C. Hetherington & Michael P. 
Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed Statutory Solution to the Remaining 
Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. REV. 1, 12 & n.30 (1977) (mentioning the tradi­
tional view that duties run “solely between the majority and the corporation,” and ob­
serving that “[t]he notion that the fiduciary obligations of management run only to the 
corporation provides the minority in close corporations virtually no protection against 
oppression and exploitation by the control group”). 
13. See Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 12, at 12 (“[C]ourts undoubtedly . . . R 
have been influenced by traditional common law attitudes emphasizing . . . proof of 
harm to the corporation, as distinguished from the interests of individual sharehold­
ers.”); cf. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 513 & n.14 (noting, while discussing traditional fidu­
ciary duty principles, that “in practice, the plaintiff will find difficulty in challenging 
dividend or employment policies,” and observing that “[i]t would be difficult for the 
plaintiff in the instant case to establish breach of a fiduciary duty owed to the corpora­
tion, as indicated by the finding of the trial judge” (emphasis added)). 
14. See Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 515.  Indeed, the court found that the share­
holder-to-shareholder fiduciary duty was breached, even though the court did not disa­
gree with the trial court’s finding that the stock repurchase was fair to the corporation. 
See id. at 519 (“Although the purchase price for the controlling stockholder’s shares 
may seem fair to the corporation and other stockholders . . . the controlling stockholder 
whose stock has been purchased has still received a relative advantage over his fellow 
stockholders, inconsistent with his strict fiduciary duty.” (citation omitted)). 
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action can be brought directly without having to comply with deriv­
ative lawsuit requirements.15 
While Donahue has been credited with contributing to this le­
gal development, the notion of a shareholder-to-shareholder fiduci­
ary duty is not unique to Donahue and its progeny.  Under 
traditional corporate law, a number of judicial decisions speak of a 
duty owed by the majority to the minority in the controlling share­
holder context.16  Even Delaware—a jurisdiction that has explicitly 
rejected special common law rules for minority shareholders in 
closely held corporations17—has judicial decisions indicating that 
controlling shareholders owe fiduciary duties directly to individual 
15. See, e.g., Joseph v. Koshy, No. 01-98-01432-CV, 2000 WL 124685, at *4 (Tex. 
App. Feb. 3, 2000) (stating that plaintiff minority shareholders’ allegations of oppres­
sion and breach of fiduciary duty “were individual [actions] and did not belong to the 
corporation,” and concluding, as a result, that compliance with derivative lawsuit re­
quirements was unnecessary); id. (noting that plaintiff minority shareholders alleged 
“breach of a fiduciary duty owed to them,” and stating that “[c]ourts have recognized 
minority shareholders’ individual causes of action for oppressive conduct and breach of 
fiduciary duty” (emphasis added)). 
16. See, e.g., S. Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1919) (noting that “[t]he 
majority has the right to control; but when it does so, it occupies a fiduciary relation 
toward the minority . . . .”); In re Reading Co., 711 F.2d 509, 512-13, 520 (3d Cir. 1983) 
(concluding, in a lawsuit by a minority shareholder (Reading Company) for breach of 
fiduciary duty, that “neither the directors nor the majority shareholders of [the corpora­
tion] have breached their fiduciary duty to Reading”); Riblet Prods. Corp. v. Nagy, 683 
A.2d 37, 40 (Del. 1996) (“To be sure, the Majority Stockholders may well owe fiduciary 
duties to Nagy [a single shareholder] as a minority stockholder.”); Yiannatsis v. 
Stephanis, 653 A.2d 275, 279 & n.3, 280 (Del. 1995) (noting that Demos and Stella were 
controlling shareholders of the corporation and that John was a minority shareholder, 
and stating that “Demos and Stella had a fiduciary duty to [John] as an individual as 
well as their fiduciary duty to the corporation”); see also Byelick v. Vivadelli, 79 F. 
Supp. 2d 610, 623-25 (E.D. Va. 1999) (noting that the rule that a director’s fiduciary 
duty runs to the shareholders as a class rather than to an individual shareholder is ap­
propriate for the publicly held corporation, but acknowledging that “closely-held corpo­
rations raise a different set of concerns [:] . . . it is reasonable to conclude that, if faced 
with the question whether a minority shareholder of a closely held corporation has a 
cognizable claim against an inside director for breach of fiduciary duty in respect of a 
corporate transaction which benefits the inside director, the Supreme Court of Virginia 
would hold in the affirmative, particularly where, as here, there is only one minority 
shareholder”). 
17. See, e.g., Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1379-81 (Del. 1993); see also 
Clemmer v. Cullinane, 815 N.E.2d 651, 652 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004) (“That [Nixon] deci­
sion—in ‘very forceful dicta’—declined to adopt the heightened fiduciary duty of ‘ut­
most good faith and loyalty’ our courts have found applicable to close corporations. 
Rather, the court declared that no ‘special judicially-created rules’ would be recognized 
to protect minority shareholders in closely held corporations.” (footnotes omitted) 
(quoting Nixon, 626 A.2d at 1380-81)). See generally MOLL & RAGAZZO, supra note 5, R 
§ 7.01[D][2], at 7-108 to 7-119 (discussing Nixon). 
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minority shareholders.18  At least with respect to minority share­
holders challenging the actions of a controlling shareholder or con­
trolling group, therefore, decisions like Donahue seem unnecessary 
to establish a direct, shareholder-centered cause of action. 
B. A Duty for Everyone, Including the Minority 
Perhaps the change in the law brought about by Donahue and 
similar cases is the fact that minority shareholders may also owe a 
fiduciary duty.  Traditional corporate law accepts that controlling 
shareholders owe fiduciary duties, but whether minority sharehold­
ers owe similar duties is less clear.  In Donahue, however, the court 
explicitly stated that “[w]e do not limit our holding to majority 
stockholders,” and it noted that, “[i]n the close corporation, the mi­
nority may do equal damage through unscrupulous and improper 
‘sharp dealings’ with an unsuspecting majority.”19 
While the notion that Donahue changed the law by imposing a 
fiduciary duty on minority shareholders is promising, there are two 
complications.  First, presumably a minority shareholder would not 
be subject to a fiduciary duty analysis unless the minority possessed 
the power to cause harm to the corporation or the other sharehold­
ers.  The possession of such power, however, would likely cause a 
court to characterize the minority as a de facto controlling share­
holder—at least with respect to the activities that the minority does 
have the power to control.20  Even without the Donahue holding, in 
other words, traditional corporate law might be sufficiently pliable 
to allow a court to impose a fiduciary duty on a minority share­
18. See supra note 16. R 
19. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 515 n.17; see, e.g., A.W. Chesterton Co. v. Chester-
ton, 128 F.3d 1, 3, 6 (1st Cir. 1997) (concluding that a minority shareholder breached his 
fiduciary duty by threatening to transfer his shares in a manner that would have de­
stroyed the S-corporation status of the company); see also Zimmerman v. Bogoff, 524 
N.E.2d 849, 853 (Mass. 1988) (noting that “[t]he protections of Donahue are not limited 
to those with less than 50% share ownership,” and stating that “fiduciary obligations 
may arise regardless of percentage of share ownership”); Whitehorn v. Whitehorn 
Farms, Inc., 195 P.3d 836, 843 (Mont. 2008) (noting that “fiduciary duties run between 
all shareholders, not just from majority shareholders to minority shareholders”). 
20. See, e.g., Smith v. Atl. Props., 422 N.E.2d 798, 799, 802 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981) 
(involving a 25% minority shareholder who possessed a veto power pursuant to an 80% 
supermajority provision: “The 80% provision may have substantially the effect of re­
versing the usual roles of the majority and the minority shareholders. The minority, 
under that provision, becomes an ad hoc controlling interest”). 
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holder under the “controlling” shareholder precedents. The mat­
ter, however, is not free from doubt.21 
Second, it is not clear that other jurisdictions have followed 
this part of the Donahue holding.22  Many of the non-Massachusetts 
courts imposing a fiduciary duty between shareholders in closely 
held corporations speak of a duty owed by the majority or control­
ling shareholder to the minority shareholders.23  While such state­
21. See, e.g., Merner v. Merner, 129 Fed. App’x 342, 342-44 (9th Cir. 2005) (al­
lowing a minority shareholder in a closely held corporation to transfer shares in a man­
ner that destroyed the S-corporation status of the company, and concluding that a 
minority shareholder in a closely held corporation owes no special fiduciary duties); cf. 
Hunt v. Data Mgmt. Res., Inc., 985 P.2d 730, 732-33 (Kan. Ct. App. 1999) (allowing a 
minority shareholder in a closely held corporation to transfer shares in a manner that 
destroyed the S-corporation status of the company, and noting that “[t]he law does not 
impose a strict fiduciary duty on a shareholder to act in the best interests of the corpo­
ration; a shareholder is free to act in his or her own self-interest”). 
22. It is not clear, in other words, that the law, at least outside of Massachusetts, 
has changed on this point. 
23. See, e.g., Guy v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 1086, 1090 (N.D. Ill. 1987) 
(stating that “the majority shareholder of a closely-held corporation clearly has a fiduci­
ary responsibility to the other shareholders” (citation omitted)); Orchard v. Covelli, 590 
F. Supp. 1548, 1556 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (discussing “the majority’s fulfillment of its fiduci­
ary duty to the other shareholders”); Fought v. Morris, 543 So. 2d 167, 171 (Miss. 1989) 
(concluding that “in a close corporation where a majority stockholder stands to benefit 
as a controlling stockholder, the majority’s action must be ‘intrinsically fair’ to the mi­
nority interest”); Crosby v. Beam, 548 N.E.2d 217, 220 (Ohio 1989) (“Generally, major­
ity shareholders have a fiduciary duty to minority shareholders.”); Hoggett v. Brown, 
971 S.W.2d 472, 488 n.13 (Tex. App. 1997) (noting that “a majority shareholder’s fiduci­
ary duty ordinarily runs to the corporation,” but stating that “in certain limited circum­
stances, a majority shareholder who dominates control over the business may owe such 
a duty to the minority shareholder”); Jorgensen v. Water Works, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 98, 
105 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998) (“Courts in other jurisdictions that, like Wisconsin, recognize a 
claim for breach of fiduciary duty by directors and majority shareholders to minority 
shareholders have permitted such claims in circumstances factually similar to those al­
leged here.”). 
Like Donahue, other cases speak of a fiduciary duty owed between shareholders in 
closely held corporations.  Unlike Donahue, however, these cases do not include lan­
guage explicitly imposing this duty upon minority shareholders.  Moreover, the fact pat­
terns do not involve minority shareholder defendants. See, e.g., Georgeson v. DuPage 
Surgical Consultants, Ltd., No. 05 CV 1653, 2007 WL 914219, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 
2007) (stating that “[s]hareholders in a close corporation owe a fiduciary duty to deal 
fairly, honestly, and openly with each other,” but involving alleged misconduct by the 
controlling shareholders); Melrose v. Capitol City Motor Lodge, Inc., 705 N.E.2d 985, 
987 & n.3, 991 (Ind. 1998) (stating that “we have held that ‘shareholders in a close 
corporation stand in a fiduciary relationship to each other, and as such, must deal fairly, 
honestly, and openly with the corporation and with their fellow shareholders,’” but 
involving alleged misconduct by a 50% shareholder (quoting Barth v. Barth, 659 N.E.2d 
559, 561 (Ind. 1995))); Evans v. Blesi, 345 N.W.2d 775, 777-80 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) 
(stating that “Blesi and Evans were partners in a closely held corporation,” that “the 
relationship between them was fiduciary,” and that “[t]he law imposes on each the high­
est standard of integrity in their dealings with each other,” but involving alleged mis­
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ments do not preclude a finding that a minority shareholder also 
owes a fiduciary duty, the explicitness of the proposition in Dona-
hue is not usually present in these other opinions.24 
C. The Policing of De Facto Dividends 
It could be argued that Donahue changed the law by signaling 
a willingness to provide greater judicial assistance to shareholders 
challenging dividend or employment policies.  After mentioning 
that “[s]uch policies are considered to be within the judgment of the 
directors,” and after observing that, “generally, plaintiffs who seek 
judicial assistance against corporate dividend or employment poli­
cies do not prevail,” the court then imposed its duty of utmost good 
faith and loyalty.25  The juxtaposition of problem and apparent so­
lution suggests that the court meant for the Donahue duty to pro­
vide greater judicial scrutiny of majority dividend and employment 
decisions than traditional corporate law would provide. 
While there is something to the notion that Donahue altered 
the traditional business judgment rule discretion afforded to man-
conduct by a 50% shareholder who later became a controlling shareholder); 
McLaughlin v. Schenck, 220 P.3d 146, 151, 156, 158 (Utah 2009) (concluding that 
“shareholders in closely held corporations owe their coshareholders fiduciary obliga­
tions,” but involving alleged misconduct by a controlling shareholder). 
Other cases indicate that a fiduciary duty is imposed upon minority shareholders 
by (1) explicit language saying as much and/or (2) fact patterns involving minority 
shareholder defendants. See, e.g., Whitehorn, 195 P.3d at 843 (noting that “fiduciary 
duties run between all shareholders, not just from majority shareholders to minority 
shareholders,” but involving a claim against majority shareholders); I.P. Homeowners, 
Inc. v. Radtke, 558 N.W.2d 582, 589, 591-92 (Neb. Ct. App. 1997) (stating that 
“[s]hareholders in a close corporation owe one another the same fiduciary duty as that 
owed by one partner to another in a partnership,” and imposing a fiduciary duty on a 
minority shareholder who usurped a corporate opportunity); A. Teixeira & Co. v. Tei­
xeira, 699 A.2d 1383, 1386-87 (R.I. 1997) (stating that “[t]oday we conclude on the basis 
of the small number of shareholders in plaintiff corporation, the active participation by 
these shareholders in management decisions, and their close and intimate working rela­
tions, that the shareholders of plaintiff corporation, by acting as if they were partners, 
thus assumed a fiduciary duty toward one another and their corporation,” and imposing 
that duty on two minority shareholders who allegedly usurped a corporate opportu­
nity); cf. Walta v. Gallegos Law Firm, P.C., 40 P.3d 449, 456, 458 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001) 
(noting that “some courts have explicitly recognized that the [fiduciary] duty extends to 
minority shareholders in close corporations,” but stating that “[i]n adopting the Massa­
chusetts approach, we are clearly aligning ourselves with the line of cases which impose 
a high duty of candor and good faith when majority shareholders are dealing with mi­
nority shareholders”). 
24. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. R 
25. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 513-15 (Mass. 1975) (foot­
note omitted). 
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agers over internal business matters,26 the claim should not be over­
stated.  Dividend and employment policies are frequently used to 
deny a minority investor his proportionate share of the distributed 
profits of the company.  When used in this manner, however, tradi­
tional corporate law is available to remedy the misconduct. 
For example, it is common for a closely held corporation to 
distribute its earnings to shareholders in the form of employment-
related compensation rather than in the form of dividends.27  Many 
closely held corporations, in other words, distribute profit to share­
holders not as “true” dividends but as “de facto” dividends—i.e., 
dividends disguised, for tax purposes, as employment-related com­
pensation.28  So long as all of the stockholders are receiving their 
proportionate share of any de facto dividends, the presence of such 
dividends is largely unobjectionable.29  When a controlling share­
26. See infra Part II.B. 
27. When calculating its taxable income, a closely held corporation can deduct 
reasonable salaries paid to its employees to decrease the amount of income tax that the 
company pays. See 26 U.S.C. § 162(a)(1) (2006) (stating that “a reasonable allowance 
for salaries or other compensation for personal services actually rendered” is deducti­
ble).  A closely held corporation cannot, however, deduct any dividends paid to its 
shareholders.  Robert B. Thompson, Corporate Dissolution and Shareholders’ Reasona­
ble Expectations, 66 WASH. U. L. Q. 193, 197 n.12 (1988). As a consequence, corporate 
income paid as dividends is subject to double taxation—once as business income at the 
corporate level, and once as personal income at the shareholder level. Id. As a result 
of the tax-disadvantaged nature of dividends, many closely held corporations forego 
“true” dividends and instead provide a return to shareholders via salary and other em­
ployment-related benefits. See, e.g., Landorf v. Glottstein, 500 N.Y.S.2d 494, 499 (Sup. 
Ct. 1986) (stating that, in a closely held corporation, “dividends are often provided by 
means of salaries to shareholders”); Hirschkorn v. Severson, 319 N.W.2d 475, 477 (N.D. 
1982) (“[T]he corporation paid no dividends . . . .  Rather, the corporate directors dis­
tributed the profits via salary increases, bonuses, and benefits.”).  It should be noted 
that the impact of the double tax is ameliorated by the fact that qualifying dividends (as 
well as long-term capital gains) are presently taxed at a 15% rate, which is lower than 
the highest rates applicable to salary and other forms of ordinary income. See IRS.GOV, 
http://www.irs.gov/publications/p17/ch08.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2011).  Unless ex­
tended, the current 15% rate is set to expire at the end of 2010. Tax Cuts Set to Expire 
at the End of 2010: What This May Mean for Investors (Sept. 28, 2010), available at 
https://admin.emeraldconnect.com/files/44735/Janney%20Tax%20Sunsetting.pdf. 
28. See supra note 27. R 
29. While perhaps unobjectionable to the shareholders, such de facto dividends 
are objectionable to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The IRS often sues to disal­
low the deduction of “unreasonable” amounts of compensation.  When the IRS is suc­
cessful, the amount of compensation that exceeds a “reasonable” amount is treated as a 
dividend and is not deductible from the corporation’s income. See, e.g., Eberl’s Claim 
Serv., Inc. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 249 F.3d 994, 996, 1004 (10th Cir. 2001) 
(affirming a determination that a portion of a taxpayer’s salary constituted “disguised 
dividend payments that should have been subject to taxation”); Rapco, Inc. v. Comm’r 
of Internal Revenue, 85 F.3d 950, 955-56 (2d Cir. 1996) (upholding a determination that 
an officer’s salary was excessive). 
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holder terminates the minority’s employment in a corporation 
where profits are distributed solely via salary, however, the termi­
nation often results in the controlling shareholder continuing to re­
ceive de facto dividends while the minority is denied his 
proportionate share.30  This is problematic, as a de facto dividend is 
still a dividend and, like all dividends, it must ordinarily be paid on 
an equivalent, per-share basis.31  Such a non-uniform declaration of 
dividends is impermissible and even traditional corporate law— 
with its business judgment rule deference—would not protect it.32 
30. See, e.g., Landorf, 500 N.Y.S.2d at 499 (“In a close corporation, since divi­
dends are often provided by means of salaries to shareholders, loss of salary may be the 
functional equivalent of the denial of participation in dividends.”); see also Nagy v. 
Riblet Prods. Corp., 79 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Many closely held firms en­
deavor to show no profits (to minimize their taxes) and to distribute the real economic 
returns of the business to the investors as salary.  When firms are organized in this way, 
firing an employee is little different from canceling his shares.” (emphasis added)). 
31. See, e.g., Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270, 277 (Alaska 1980) 
(“Courts have not allowed the form of the transaction to prevent tax liability when the 
transaction is in substance a distribution of dividends. We think a similar analysis 
should apply to payments which exclude some shareholders in a closely held corpora­
tion.  Such transactions should be examined to determine whether they are in fact a 
distribution of dividends, and if so the excluded shareholder must participate equally in 
the payments received by other shareholders.” (footnote omitted) (citation omitted)); 
Leslie v. Boston Software Collaborative, Inc., No. 010268BLS, 2002 WL 532605, at *9 
(Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 12, 2002) (“What must not be done is to make payments only to 
the majority shareholders, payments having different names or styles but being in real­
ity dividends.”). 
32. See, e.g., Cratty v. Peoria Law Library Ass’n, 76 N.E. 707, 708 (Ill. 1906) 
(“Dividends among stockholders of the same class must always be equal and without 
discrimination . . . .”); Toner v. Baltimore Envelope Co., 498 A.2d 642, 645 (Md. 1985) 
(“We have said that a corporation in making a dividend . . . has no power to discrimi­
nate between its stockholders [of the same class].” (alteration in original) (citation 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also In re Reading Co., 711 F.2d 509, 
519 (3d Cir. 1983) (noting that “ordinarily . . . dividends must be apportioned among 
the shareholders pro rata to their several holdings”); In re Sealand Corp. S’holders 
Litig., 642 A.2d 792, 799 (Del. Ch. 1993) (noting the “uncontroversial proposition” that 
“all shares of the same type, series, or class are, by definition, equal”).  As the Sealand 
court observed: 
It has long been acknowledged that absent an express agreement or statute to 
the contrary, all shares of stock are equal.  Flowing from that premise is the 
rule that all shares of the same class or series are equally entitled to share in 
the profits of the corporation and in the distribution of its assets on 
liquidation. 
Id. at 799 n.10 (citations omitted). 
As the above citations suggest, the business judgment rule would not prevent a 
court from granting relief if only certain shareholders received dividends.  Such conduct 
would likely be viewed as fraud, bad faith, or irrational conduct—all of which would 
preclude application of the rule. See, e.g., Ralph A. Peeples, The Use and Misuse of the 
Business Judgment Rule in the Close Corporation, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 456, 471 & 
n.18 (1985) (“If only certain shareholders received dividends, the business judgment 
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Simply put, disputes involving de facto dividends are relatively 
easy to resolve. After all, these disputes typically involve a control­
ling shareholder who takes a disproportionate amount of the com­
pany’s profit.  Such conduct is clearly unlawful, and it can be 
characterized as unlawful in a number of different ways—e.g., fraud 
on the minority investors, bad faith to the minority investors, an 
illegal dividend to the majority, or plain and simple theft by the 
majority.33  Thus, the existence of a Donahue duty is not needed to 
trigger liability in de facto dividend disputes, even when those dis­
putes involve employment issues.  If dividends are distributed in a 
disproportionate manner through employment, related-party con­
tracts, or any other manner, such conduct is antithetical to the pro 
rata nature of a dividend and is illegal under traditional corporate 
law principles.34 
To be clear, one can credit Donahue with recognizing that em­
ployment in a closely held corporation is often a vehicle for distrib­
uting de facto dividends.35  This recognition is an important 
contribution.  My point is simply that traditional corporate law al­
ready prohibits disproportionate dividends, and the de facto nature 
of the dividends should make no difference. Thus, while Donahue’s 
recognition of the employment-as-disguised-dividends problem is 
important, the Donahue duty is not needed to regulate the 
problem. 
D. The Application of Partnership Principles 
As part of its rationale for imposing a shareholder-to-share­
holder fiduciary duty, the Donahue court discussed the similarities 
between the closely held corporation and the partnership.36  Ac­
cording to the court, “[m]any close corporations are ‘really partner-
rule would not bar a court from granting relief to the excluded shareholders. . . .  Such 
conduct would presumably lack the ‘rational basis’ required for the invocation of the 
business judgment rule.  It would also strongly indicate [a] lack of good faith.”); see also 
infra note 68 and accompanying text.  As mentioned, because employment is often the R 
vehicle for distributing profits in a closely held corporation, the termination of a minor­
ity shareholder’s employment can be a mechanism for the majority to appropriate a 
disproportionate share of the company’s income stream to itself.  In such circumstances, 
the termination would likely be viewed as tainted by a conflict of interest, which would 
also preclude the application of the business judgment rule. See infra note 68 and ac- R 
companying text. 
33. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. R 
34. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text. R 
35. See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 513-14 (Mass. 1975). 
36. See id. at 512-15. 
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ships, between two or three people who contribute their capital, 
skills, experience and labor.’”37  Similarly, the court observed that 
“[c]ommentators and courts have noted that the close corporation 
is often little more than an ‘incorporated’ or ‘chartered’ partner­
ship.”38  Perhaps the legal change effectuated by Donahue, there­
fore, is that it provides doctrinal authority for courts to incorporate 
partnership principles into closely held corporation disputes.39 
Such an interpretation of Donahue, however, is erroneous. 
The Donahue court was not arguing for the wholesale application 
of partnership principles to the closely held corporation. The court 
analogized to partnerships simply to impose a partnership-like 
owner-to-owner fiduciary duty.40  Other aspects of partnership law 
that might have been helpful to the plaintiff—e.g., the more liberal 
dissolution rules, or the granting of a right to participate in the 
management of the business41—were not imported. This strongly 
suggests that the Donahue court did not intend to hold that part­
nership law applies in toto to closely held corporation disputes.  As 
further evidence, in the later decision of Wilkes v. Springside Nurs­
ing Home, Inc., the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court con­
fronted the issue of whether a minority shareholder could be 
removed from the management of a closely held corporation.42  The 
court granted relief to the plaintiff minority without even referenc­
ing a partner’s right to participate in the management of the busi­
ness.43  Finally, in the recent decision of Brodie v. Jordan, the 
Supreme Judicial Court addressed the propriety of a buyout award 
in a closely held corporation dispute.44  The court’s analysis does 
not even mention the right under partnership law to a buyout or 
dissolution upon the dissociation of a partner from the business.45 
37. Id. at 512 (quoting Kruger v. Gerth, 210 N.E.2d 355, 356 (N.Y. 1965) 
(Desmond, C.J., dissenting)). 
38. Id. 
39. I have had several conversations with practicing attorneys who read Donahue 
and similar precedents as authority for precisely this point. 
40. See REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 404 (1997) (imposing fiduciary duties on a 
partner that he owes to the partnership “and the other partners”).  As discussed, it is 
not clear that an analogy to partnership law was necessary to impose this duty.  Under 
traditional corporate law, a number of judicial decisions speak of a duty owed by the 
majority to the minority in the controlling shareholder context. See supra Part I.A. 
41. See REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT §§ 401(f), 801. 
42. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976). 
43. Id. at 661-65. 
44. Brodie v. Jordan, 857 N.E.2d 1076 (Mass. 2006). 
45. Id. at 1080-82. 
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Thus, it is simply inaccurate to read Donahue for the proposition 
that partnership law applies in its entirety to closely held corpora­
tion disputes.46 
Importing the entirety of partnership law into the closely held 
corporation setting is unwise from a policy standpoint as well. 
While courts such as Donahue suggest that shareholders form a cor­
poration for its limited liability protection but otherwise wish to be 
treated as partners, that suggestion is questionable.  Perhaps the 
shareholders chose a corporation to avoid the default agency provi­
sions of the partnership structure.47  Perhaps they chose a corpora­
tion to eliminate the ability of one owner to veto extraordinary 
business decisions.48  Simply put, shareholders in closely held cor­
porations may have chosen a corporation for various reasons; as a 
result, a wholesale application of partnership law may be just as 
likely to defeat their expectations as it is to meet them.49 
46. In the previous three sections, the focus of my argument is that Donahue did 
not change the law because the same result would be reached under traditional corpo­
rate law principles. See supra Part I.A-C.  In this section, the focus of my argument is 
different—Donahue did not change the law because the purported change is premised 
on an erroneous interpretation of the decision. 
47. See REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 301 (1997). 
48. See id. § 401(j). 
49. As Professors Easterbrook and Fischel have observed: 
The participants incorporated for a reason.  Perhaps the reason was only lim­
ited liability or favorable tax treatment, and in all other respects they wanted 
to be treated like partners.  But this is not the only possibility.  Corporate law 
is different from partnership law in many ways, and the venturers may desire 
to preserve these differences.  Partners, for example, are entitled to share 
equally in the profits and management of the partnership, are mutual agents 
for each other, have the right to veto any decisions made by the majority on 
matters outside the ordinary course of business, and have the right to dissolve 
the partnership at any time if they are willing to bear the consequences.  Cor­
porate law treats each of these differently.  Proponents of the partnership 
analogy assume that participants in closely held corporations are knowledgea­
ble enough to incorporate to obtain the benefits of favorable tax treatment or 
limited liability but ignorant of all other differences between corporate and 
partnership law.  There is no support for this assumption once you realize that 
people have to jump through a lot of formal hoops (assisted by counsel) to 
incorporate but could become partners by accident. 
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 11, at 298 (footnotes omitted); cf. Bagdon v. Bridge- R 
stone/Firestone, Inc., 916 F.2d 379, 384 (7th Cir. 1990) (“Corporations are not partner­
ships.  Whether to incorporate entails a choice of many formalities.  Commercial rules 
should be predictable; this objective is best served by treating corporations as what they 
are, allowing the investors and other participants to vary the rules by contract if they 
think deviations are warranted.”). 
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II.	 DONAHUE’S CHANGES: MUCH ADO ABOUT . . . SOMETHING 
(AND IMPORTANT SOMETHING(S) AT THAT) 
A. The Protection of Employment and Management Rights 
Even if a fiduciary duty analysis under traditional corporate 
law focuses on an individual shareholder,50 that analysis is impli­
cated only when majority conduct affects shareholder rights.51  Em­
ployment and management positions with a corporation, however, 
are not traditionally viewed as part of one’s rights as a shareholder. 
In fact, stock ownership and employment/management benefits are 
largely viewed as unrelated in the publicly held setting.52  This helps 
to explain why terminations of employment and removals from 
management positions—two primary components of a classic 
freeze-out—rarely invoke corporate law scrutiny in publicly held 
corporations.  Such actions are not viewed as affecting shareholder 
rights.53 
In a closely held corporation, however, most terminations of 
employment and removals from management positions do affect 
shareholder rights, as employment and management benefits are 
typically a substantial part of a shareholder’s return on investment. 
50. See supra Part I.A. 
51. See, e.g., Riblet Prods. Corp. v. Nagy, 683 A.2d 37, 40 (Del. 1996) (“This is not 
a case of breach of fiduciary duty to Nagy [a minority shareholder] qua stockholder . . . . 
Nagy does not allege that his termination amounted to a wrongful freeze out of his 
stock interest in [the corporation], nor does he contend that he was harmed as a stock­
holder by being terminated.”). 
52. As one commentator observed: 
From the standpoint of an employee in a publicly held corporation . . . the 
economic interest in stock ownership and the economic interest in employ­
ment are largely separate.  As a stockholder, the employee’s interest is the 
same as all other stockholders.  The employee-stockholder seeks an expected 
return on his investment that adequately compensates for the risk of investing 
in the enterprise. . . . 
Such an employee’s interest in his job, by contrast, is some function of the 
personal satisfaction that the job brings and the level of monetary compensa­
tion and other benefits that the job provides.  If the employee is satisfied with 
his job, but comes to believe that the stock in his employer is a bad invest­
ment, the employee can simply sell the stock.  If the employee desires to 
change jobs or is fired, but continues to believe that the stock is a good invest­
ment, the employee may continue to hold stock in his former employer. The 
act of changing jobs does nothing to alter the risk-return calculation that 
makes the stock in the employer either a good or a bad investment. 
Robert A. Ragazzo, Toward a Delaware Common Law of Closely Held Corporations, 
77 WASH. U. L. Q. 1099, 1107-08 (1999). 
53. Cf. id. at 1108 (“Because these employee and stockholder interests are largely 
separate in a publicly held corporation, it is entirely proper that the general corporate 
rule provides the employee-stockholder with no special protection against discharge.”). 
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As mentioned, many closely held corporations distribute much, if 
not all, of their earnings as salaries and other employment compen­
sation.54  Consequently, one needs to maintain a job to receive a 
financial return on investment.  If this were the only purpose of em­
ployment and management positions in a closely held corporation, 
the Donahue duty would not be needed, as traditional corporate 
law can police de facto dividend abuses.  In other words, if termina­
tions of employment and removals from management positions 
have the effect of excluding a minority investor from his share of 
the company’s distributed earnings, those actions would be illegal 
under traditional corporate law principles.55 
Employment and management positions in a closely held cor­
poration, however, are important even in the absence of de facto 
dividends.  Many closely held corporations are small start-up busi­
nesses that face a high risk of failure.56  Because of the uncertainty 
surrounding whether the business will have any earnings at all, let 
alone earnings growth or consistency,57 the shareholder’s initial de­
cision to invest is often based primarily on the definitive benefits of 
employment and related management positions, rather than on the 
speculative possibilities of earnings growth.  Indeed, a job and a 
management position in a closely held corporation is often associ­
ated with a higher salary,58 a significant participatory role in the 
54. See supra Part I.C. 
55. See supra Part I.C. 
56. See MICHAEL E. GERBER, THE E-MYTH REVISITED: WHY MOST SMALL BUSI­
NESSES  DON’T  WORK AND  WHAT TO  DO  ABOUT  IT 2 (HarperCollins eds., 1995).  As 
Gerber observes: 
Businesses start and fail in the United States at an increasingly staggering rate.
 
Every year, over a million people in this country start a business of some sort.
 
Statistics tell us that by the end of the first year at least 40 percent of them will
 
be out of business.  Within five years, more than 80 percent of them . . . will
 
have failed . . . .  [M]ore than 80 percent of the small businesses that survive
 
the first five years fail in the second five.
 
Id.; see also Ragazzo, supra note 52, at 1109 (“Small businesses are exceedingly risky R 
enterprises with high failure rates.”). 
57. Cf. GERBER, supra note 56, at 2 (noting that “hundreds of thousands of peo- R 
ple every year . . . pour their energy and capital—and life—into starting a small busi­
ness and fail,” and stating that “many others . . . struggle along for years simply trying to 
survive”). 
58. This assertion, of course, assumes a comparison between similar jobs in busi­
nesses at similar stages of development. See, e.g., SHANNON P. PRATT ET AL., VALUING 
A  BUSINESS: THE  ANALYSIS AND  APPRAISAL OF  CLOSELY  HELD  COMPANIES 121 (3d 
ed. 1996) (“It is not uncommon to find an owner/manager of a successful closely held 
company earning a greater amount in annual compensation than the amount an 
equivalent nonowner employee would earn as compensation.”); see also Bonavita v. 
Corbo, 692 A.2d 119, 124 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1996) (“[W]hile there is no claim 
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company’s activities,59 and intangible benefits stemming from work­
ing for oneself.60  These financial and other benefits of employment 
and management positions in a closely held corporation help to off­
set the high risk of failure associated with investing in a small busi­
ness.  Without these benefits, an investment in a closely held 
corporation often makes little economic sense: 
that the [closely held corporation] salaries are excessive, neither was there a showing 
that if the ‘inside’ employment were terminated those family members could earn as 
much elsewhere.”); Nelson v. Martin, 958 S.W.2d 643, 644 (Tenn. 1997) (noting that the 
annual compensation of a shareholder-employee of a commercial printing business 
“was in excess of $250,000”). 
59. This participatory role provides the shareholder with both the prestige of a 
senior management position and the opportunity to monitor his investment: 
[I]nvestors are also motivated to commit capital to a close corporation because 
of their desire for management participation as a director or officer of the 
company.  Aside from the prestige and other intangibles associated with hold­
ing a director or officer position, a management role also presents an opportu­
nity to effectively monitor the shareholder’s investment. 
Within a close corporation, such a monitoring ability is vitally important. 
After all, close corporation shareholders often invest a substantial portion of 
their life savings in the company and, as a consequence, they need some way 
of protecting their investment.  Unfortunately, a mere shareholder has no say 
in routine corporate decisionmaking.  Moreover, although shareholders have 
the statutory right to inspect a company’s books and records with a proper 
purpose, that right is easily hindered by a majority shareholder intent on ob­
structing such an inspection.  As a consequence, mere shareholders often lack 
both a voice in the company’s decisionmaking process as well as access to 
information about the company’s affairs.  Because management has the ability 
to make corporate decisions and has access to corporate information, how­
ever, a management role provides a direct opportunity for a shareholder to 
effectively participate in and monitor the company’s activities.  Ideally, such 
an opportunity allows the shareholder to try and steer the business away from 
investment-threatening decisions. 
Douglas K. Moll, Reasonable Expectations v. Implied-in-Fact Contracts: Is the Share­
holder Oppression Doctrine Needed?, 42 B.C. L. REV. 989, 1015-16 (2001) (footnotes 
omitted); see also 1 F. HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O’NEAL AND 
THOMPSON’S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS AND LLC MEMBERS § 3:6, at 
3-45 (2d ed. 2004) (“[L]osing the prestige of a directorship may be of considerable con­
sequence to the shareholder.”); id. § 3:7, at 3-57 (referring to the “prestige, privileges, 
and patronage that come from controlling a corporation and occupying its principal 
offices”). 
60. See, e.g., Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales, Inc., 535 N.E.2d 1311, 1319 (N.Y. 
1989) (Hancock, J., dissenting) (noting “the challenge, the independence, the prestige, 
the feeling of achievement, and the other intangible benefits of being part of the man­
agement of a successfully run small company”); see also Steven C. Bahls, Resolving 
Shareholder Dissension: Selection of the Appropriate Equitable Remedy, 15 J. CORP. L. 
285, 290-91 (1990) (noting that ownership in a closely held corporation includes “the 
social status and challenge of operating one’s own company and the satisfaction of pro­
viding employment to one’s children”); id. at 319 n.212 (mentioning the “loss of satis­
faction and other qualitative perks associated with operating a business”). 
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In a closely held corporation, a shareholder-employee has inter­
ests in his job and stock that are often economically intertwined. 
Holding stock in a closely held corporation, viewed purely as an 
investment decision, seems almost irrational from an economic 
perspective.  Small businesses are exceedingly risky enterprises 
with high failure rates.  To compensate fairly for this level of risk, 
the expected return would also have to be disproportionately 
large. Moreover, many investors in small businesses invest a sig­
nificant portion of their life savings in the business. This practice 
defeats their ability to diversify their investment portfolios and 
exposes them to company- and industry-specific risk.  As a result, 
investors in closely held corporations would seem well advised to 
trust their capital to diversified mutual funds rather than a small 
corporation. 
If investors in closely held corporations are economically ra­
tional, it can only be because such investments have compensat­
ing benefits not available to investors in publicly held 
corporations.  In many cases, a shareholder in a closely held cor­
poration expects to receive such compensating benefits through 
employment.  The shareholder may invest for the purpose of hav­
ing a job that produces higher compensation than could be gar­
nered through employment by third parties.  Even if the 
employee-shareholder’s compensation is no higher than his next 
best alternative, an investment in a closely held corporation may 
still be justified because the ability to keep his job may be more 
stable and certain. Additionally, the employee may simply derive 
satisfaction from working in a business that he himself takes a 
substantial part in managing. . . . 
Thus, a shareholder in a closely held corporation often has a 
significant investment interest in his job.  He often invests for the 
purpose of having a job, and the salary and other benefits he re­
ceives are conceived to be part of the return on his investment 
. . . .  After discharge, the minority is relegated to the corpora­
tion’s expected returns to justify the risk of its investment capital. 
As discussed above, these returns are unlikely to be satisfactory 
on their own.61 
In the closely held setting, therefore, majority conduct that 
negatively affects a shareholder’s employment or management po­
sition will often impact the shareholder’s expected return.  As a re­
sult, the conduct can usually be viewed as harming the 
shareholder’s rights, and a fiduciary duty analysis should be in­
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voked.62  By citing terminations of employment and removals from 
management as examples of freeze-out conduct, and by suggesting 
that the shareholder-centered fiduciary duty was meant to protect 
against such conduct,63 the Donahue court demonstrated that it ap­
preciated these points.  More importantly, courts following a Dona­
hue-like approach have found breaches of fiduciary duty when the 
controlling group unjustifiably terminates the employment of a mi­
62. Majority conduct that negatively affects a shareholder’s employment or man­
agement position will not always impact the shareholder’s expected return and, corre­
spondingly, should not always be viewed as harming the shareholder’s rights. The 
shareholder must establish that all of the investors mutually understood that employ­
ment and/or management was a benefit granted to shareholders in the company.  In the 
absence of such a showing, the employment/management position should be viewed as 
unconnected to the shareholder’s expected return and outside the scope of the share­
holder’s protected rights.  As a result, a fiduciary duty analysis should not be triggered: 
A Donahue-like fiduciary duty protects shareholders and shareholder
 
rights.  When asserting that a Donahue-like fiduciary duty has been breached,
 
therefore, the plaintiff minority has the burden of proving that his shareholder
 
rights have been harmed.  When that harm is to a right or benefit that is tradi­
tionally afforded to shareholders—e.g., the right to vote . . . —that burden is
 
easily met.  So long as the plaintiff has the status of a shareholder, he is enti­
tled to all of the status-based benefits that shareholders receive. The control­
ling shareholder cannot interfere with those benefits without harming the
 
plaintiff as a shareholder and, correspondingly, implicating the duty.
 
When the minority asserts that he has been deprived of employment or
 
some other non-traditional shareholder benefit, however, his burden of prov­
ing that his shareholder rights have been harmed is satisfied only by showing
 
that, in the corporation at issue, the benefit was part of his rights as a share­
holder.  In other words, the minority must demonstrate a connection between
 
his shareholder status and the asserted benefit (an employment position, a
 
management position, or any other non-traditional shareholder benefit) by es­
tablishing that the shareholders mutually understood that the status and the
 
benefit went hand-in-hand in the company.  Stated yet another way, a Dona­
hue-like fiduciary duty protects non-traditional shareholder benefits only
 
when the minority can establish that, in his company, the benefit was reasona­
bly understood by the participants to be an entitlement that a shareholder
 
received as a result of becoming a shareholder in the venture.  By showing that
 
the participants viewed the benefit as a component of a shareholder’s return
 
on investment, the minority demonstrates that the benefit was part of his
 
rights as a shareholder in the particular corporation at issue. When the major­




MOLL & RAGAZZO, supra note 5, § 7.01[D][1][a][iii], at 7-59 to 7-61 (footnotes omit- R 
ted); see id. § 7.01[D][1][a][iii], at 7-63 (“Because the plaintiff was unable to establish a 
connection between his shareholder status and his employment in the corporation, he 
was unable to show that his termination harmed him as a shareholder.  As a result, his 
firing did not breach a fiduciary duty.”); see also id. § 7.01[D][1][b][ii][A] (discussing 
the same issue in “reasonable expectations” terms). 
63. See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 513, 515 (Mass. 1975). 
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nority shareholder and removes him from the board of directors— 
even when de facto dividends are apparently not at issue.64 
It is important to underscore that acknowledging that employ­
ment and management positions are often part of a shareholder’s 
rights in a closely held corporation,65 and recognizing that judicial 
action is needed to protect those rights even when de facto divi­
dends are not involved, enacted a meaningful change in the law.  As 
mentioned, under traditional corporate law principles, employment 
and management positions are not ordinarily viewed as part of 
one’s rights as a shareholder; thus, terminations of employment and 
removals from management do not generally invoke a fiduciary 
duty analysis.66  The Supreme Court of Utah recently made similar 
observations: 
In Riblet Products Corp. v. Nagy [683 A.2d 37 (Del. 1996)] . . . 
the Delaware Supreme Court noted that Delaware had not 
adopted Massachusetts’ approach to fiduciary duties, but instead 
imposed identical duties on shareholders of closely held corpora­
tions and public corporations.  Additionally, the Delaware Su­
preme Court distinguished between the plaintiff’s rights as a 
stockholder and his contractual rights as an employee. While the 
court noted [that] the Riblet plaintiff had not alleged that his ter­
mination amounted to a wrongful freeze-out of his stock interest, 
in subsequent cases where the plaintiff has made such allegations, 
other courts following Delaware’s approach have determined 
that any injury caused by a termination decision would only be 
an injury to an individual’s employment interests and not to his 
interests as a stockholder.  At least one court has described this 
approach as being more predictable because it treats all corpora­
tions the same way.  The Delaware approach thus stands in sharp 
contrast to the fiduciary duty standard followed by the majority 
of states.67 
64. See, e.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663-64 
(Mass. 1976) (no evidence that employment or management position was used as a 
vehicle for distributing company profits); Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383, 384-85, 
387-88 (N.D. 1987) (same). 
65. To repeat, while employment and management positions are often part of a 
shareholder’s rights in a closely held corporation, they should not always be viewed in 
this manner. See supra note 62. R 
66. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text. R 
67. McLaughlin v. Schenck, 220 P.3d 146, 154-55 (Utah 2009) (citations omitted); 
see also Berman v. Physical Med. Assocs., 225 F.3d 429, 433 (4th Cir. 2000) (stating that 
“any injury caused by the termination decision itself would be an injury to his interests 
as an employee, not as a stockholder”). 
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Thus, when Donahue and similar cases protect employment 
and management interests as part of one’s rights as a shareholder, 
the protection goes above and beyond what traditional corporate 
law would provide.  In this respect, the Donahue doctrine does re­
sult in a significant change in the law. 
B. The Dilution of Business Judgment Rule Deference 
In conjunction with its efforts to protect employment and man­
agement rights in the closely held corporation, Donahue and its 
progeny also changed the law by limiting the impact of the business 
judgment rule.  Articulations of the business judgment rule vary, 
but the rule generally operates to shield a manager from liability so 
long as the manager’s decision was made “on an informed basis, in 
good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the 
best interests of the company.”68  Under the rule, courts review the 
substantive business decisions of those in control with considerable 
deference and with a correspondingly minimal amount of scru­
tiny.69  Because of this deference, it is usually difficult to challenge 
internal matters—such as employment, management, or dividend 
decisions—in disputes involving business organizations. 
The Donahue doctrine, however, significantly curtails the ef­
fects of the business judgment rule.  By specifically noting that em­
ployment, management, dividend, and other internal decisions can 
68. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); see also Brehm v. Eisner, 
746 A.2d 244, 264 n.66 (Del. 2000) (“The business judgment rule has been well formu­
lated by . . . other cases.  Thus, directors’ decisions will be respected by courts unless the 
directors are interested or lack independence relative to the decision, do not act in good 
faith, act in a manner that cannot be attributed to a rational business purpose or reach 
their decision by a grossly negligent process that includes the failure to consider all 
material facts reasonably available.” (citation omitted)); Fields v. Sax, 462 N.E.2d 983, 
986 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (“A corporate director will not be held liable for honest errors 
or mistakes of judgment as long as the decision does not involve fraud, illegality or 
conflict of interest.”); id. at 989 (“Absent evidence of bad faith, fraud, illegality, or gross 
overreaching, courts are not at liberty to interfere with the exercise of business judg­
ment by corporate directors.”); Ironite Prods. Co. v. Samuels, 985 S.W.2d 858, 862 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1998) (“We will not interfere with the decisions of the Board of Directors 
absent fraud, illegal conduct, or an irrational business judgment.”). See generally MOLL 
& RAGAZZO, supra note 5, § 6.02[C][1], at 6-30 to 6-43 (discussing the business judg- R 
ment rule). 
69. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE  ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF  CORPORATE  LAW 93 (1991) (“Statements of the [business judgment] 
rule vary; its terms are far less important than the fact that there is a specially deferen­
tial approach.”); see also Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 662 (“[C]ourts fairly consistently have 
been disinclined to interfere in those facets of internal corporate operations, such as the 
selection and retention or dismissal of officers, directors or employees, which essentially 
involve management decisions subject to the principle of majority control.”). 
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be part of a majority-directed freeze-out, and by explicitly mention­
ing the business judgment rule as a traditional impediment to chal­
lenging such decisions,70 the Donahue court strongly suggested that 
its shareholder-to-shareholder fiduciary duty framework was meant 
to curb (if not displace) the traditional deference of the business 
judgment rule.  In fact, in the subsequent decision of Wilkes v. Spr­
ingside Nursing Home, Inc., the business judgment rule did not pre­
vent the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court from finding a 
breach of the Donahue fiduciary duty when a minority shareholder 
was unjustifiably terminated from employment and removed from 
the board of directors in a closely held corporation that did not pay 
dividends.71 
70. See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 513-14 (Mass. 1975). 
71. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663-64.  In Wilkes, the court acknowledged majority 
prerogatives and altered the Donahue framework as a result: 
[W]e are concerned that untempered application of the strict good faith stan­
dard enunciated in Donahue to cases such as the one before us will result in 
the imposition of limitations on legitimate action by the controlling group in a 
close corporation which will unduly hamper its effectiveness in managing the 
corporation in the best interests of all concerned. The majority, concededly, 
have certain rights to what has been termed “selfish ownership” in the corpo­
ration which should be balanced against the concept of their fiduciary obliga­
tion to the minority. 
Therefore, when minority stockholders in a close corporation bring suit 
against the majority alleging a breach of the strict good faith duty owed to 
them by the majority, we must carefully analyze the action taken by the con­
trolling stockholders in the individual case.  It must be asked whether the con­
trolling group can demonstrate a legitimate business purpose for its action.  In 
asking this question, we acknowledge the fact that the controlling group in a 
close corporation must have some room to maneuver in establishing the busi­
ness policy of the corporation.  It must have a large measure of discretion, for 
example, in declaring or withholding dividends, deciding whether to merge or 
consolidate, establishing the salaries of corporate officers, dismissing directors 
with or without cause, and hiring and firing corporate employees. 
When an asserted business purpose for their action is advanced by the 
majority, however, we think it is open to minority stockholders to demonstrate 
that the same legitimate objective could have been achieved through an alter­
native course of action less harmful to the minority’s interest.  If called on to 
settle a dispute, our courts must weigh the legitimate business purpose, if any, 
against the practicability of a less harmful alternative. 
Id. at 663 (citations omitted).  Despite this acknowledgement of majority prerogatives, 
subjecting the majority’s conduct to a legitimate business purpose/less harmful alterna­
tive analysis indicates that the business judgment rule has largely been displaced, as the 
court is doing more than simply asking whether a decision by the controlling group can 
be attributed to a rational business purpose. See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 
A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (observing that decisions are protected under the business 
judgment rule “if they can be attributed to any rational business purpose”).  Indeed, the 
Wilkes framework requires proof of a legitimate business purpose for the majority’s 
conduct—not simply an attribution by the court. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The 
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Put differently, the Donahue court recognized, at least implic­
itly, that conflicts of interest—the presence of which bar application 
of the business judgment rule72—can be more subtle in the closely 
held setting.  As a result, the court understood that a broader view 
of such conflicts was needed.  For example, whereas a majority-di­
rected decision to withhold dividends may affect all shares in the 
same manner,73 the decision in a closely held corporation may be 
motivated by an effort to coerce a minority shareholder to sell out 
to the majority at an unfairly low price.74  In a publicly held corpo­
ration, the denial of dividends does not have a similar coercive ef­
fect, as a company’s retention of profits simply boosts the market 
value of its shares—a value that an investor can capture at any time 
by selling into the market.75  Actions that do not appear to provide 
disproportionate benefit to the controlling group in the publicly 
held setting, in other words, may very well be designed to improp-
Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 100 (2004) 
(“[T]he reference to a rational business purpose requires only the possibility that the 
decision was actuated by a legitimate business reason, not that directors must prove the 
existence of such a reason.”).  In addition, even with proof of a legitimate business 
purpose, the Wilkes analysis still finds liability if there are alternatives that are less 
harmful to the minority. Thus, the Donahue/Wilkes framework is quite different from a 
classic business judgment rule approach, as the framework calls for close scrutiny of the 
majority’s decisions. See Terry A. O’Neill, Self-Interest and Concern for Others in the 
Owner-Managed Firm: A Suggested Approach to Dissolution and Fiduciary Obligation 
in Close Corporations, 22 SETON HALL L. REV. 646, 692 (1992) (“The burden-shifting 
scheme devised in Wilkes effectively deprives majority shareholders of the protection of 
the business judgment rule by requiring close judicial scrutiny of the majority’s action 
whenever the minority is harmed.”). 
72. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. R 
73. See Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression & Dividend Policy in the Close 
Corporation, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 841, 858-59 & n.64 (2003) (discussing the divi­
dend “irrelevance proposition” and noting that “[i]f a dividend of one dollar per share 
is paid, a . . . shareholder is enriched by one dollar per share,” while “[i]f that same 
amount is instead retained in the company, the company’s value increases by one dollar 
per share and, correspondingly, the value of the . . . stock increases by one dollar per 
share”). 
74. See, e.g., Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 515 (“Majority ‘freeze-out’ schemes which 
withhold dividends are designed to compel the minority to relinquish stock at inade­
quate prices.”); see also Litle v. Waters, Civ. A. No. 12155, 1992 WL 25758, at *8 (Del. 
Ch. Feb. 11, 1992) (describing the plaintiff’s allegation “that the company was rich with 
cash and that the only reason that the company did not make dividends was to aid [the 
majority] to buy [the minority] out for less than fair value”); Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 664 
(“[W]e may infer that a design to pressure Wilkes into selling his shares to the corpora­
tion at a price below their value well may have been at the heart of the majority’s 
plan.”). 
75. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. R 
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erly favor the controlling group in the closely held setting.76  By 
suggesting that internal management decisions should be subject to 
real scrutiny, the Donahue court showed an appreciation of this 
point and signaled that traditional business judgment rule deference 
was less appropriate in the closely held setting.77  In the years fol­
lowing Donahue, several courts have acknowledged even more ex­
plicitly that majority shareholder decisions in closely held 
corporations call for more judicial scrutiny than conventional busi­
ness judgment rule deference.78 
76. Cf. Georgeson v. DuPage Surgical Consultants, Ltd., No. 05 CV 1653, 2007 
WL 914219, at *5-6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 2007) (rejecting the defendants’ argument that, 
“as a matter of law, their conduct was not oppressive because it was protected by the 
business judgment rule” because “the presumption that normally shields defendants for 
their business decisions does not apply if the plaintiff presents evidence of fraud, bad 
faith, or self-dealing,” and observing that the evidence, “if true, would establish that the 
defendants acted in their own self-interest when they refused to compensate [the minor­
ity shareholder] for his shares and denied him the other compensation to which he 
contends he is entitled”). 
77. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 512-16.  In addition, because the managerial con­
straints provided by a market are absent in a closely held corporation, the judicial def­
erence embodied in the business judgment rule makes even less sense: 
Market restraints are most visible and workable in the case of publicly held
 
corporations.  If management is inefficient, indulges its own preferences, or
 
otherwise acts contrary to shareholder interests, dissatisfied shareholders will
 
sell their shares and move to more attractive investment opportunities.  As
 
more shareholders express their dissatisfaction by selling, the market price of
 
the company’s shares will decline to the point where existing management is
 
exposed to the risk of being displaced through a corporate takeover. . . . The
 
mere threat of displacement, whether or not realized, is a powerful incentive
 
for managers of publicly held corporations to promote their shareholders’ in­
terests so as to keep the price of the company’s shares as high and their own
 
positions as secure as possible.
 
Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 12, at 39-40; see, e.g., Rosenfield v. Metals Selling R 
Corp., 643 A.2d 1253, 1262 n.18 (Conn. 1994) (“The market for corporate control serves 
to constrain managers’ conduct that does not maximize shareholder wealth.  It there­
fore serves to align the interests of managers more closely with the interests of share­
holders in publicly traded corporations.  The market for corporate control does not 
affect, however, the incentives of managers of closely held corporations.”). 
78. See, e.g., Smith v. Atl. Props., Inc., 422 N.E.2d 798, 801, 804 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1981) (stating, in a closely held corporation dispute, that “[t]he judgment . . . necessarily 
disregards the general judicial reluctance to interfere with a corporation’s dividend pol­
icy ordinarily based upon the business judgment of its directors”); Fox v. 7L Bar Ranch 
Co., 645 P.2d 929, 935 (Mont. 1982) (“When it is also considered that in close corpora­
tions dividend withholding may be used by controlling shareholders to force out minor­
ity shareholders, the traditional judicial restraint in interfering with corporate dividend 
policy cannot be justified.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Grato v. Grato, 639 
A.2d 390, 396 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (“[J]udicial consideration of a claim of 
majority oppression or freeze-out in a closely held corporation is guided by considera­
tions broader than those espoused in defendants’ version of the ‘business judgment 
rule.’”); Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 400 A.2d 554, 561 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law 
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CONCLUSION 
Donahue had (and continues to have) a significant impact on 
the law of fiduciary duty in closely held corporations.  Unquestiona­
bly, Donahue’s legacy stems primarily from its recognition of the 
peculiar vulnerability of minority shareholders in closely held cor­
porations.  This Article has argued, however, that Donahue did 
more than merely recognize a problem—Donahue changed the law, 
although the changes that it has been credited with are overstated 
in some respects and understated in others.  While debate over the 
impact of Donahue will undoubtedly continue, it is beyond debate 
that Donahue helped to spark an evolution in the law of fiduciary 
duty in closely held corporations—an evolution that has improved 
the rights of minority shareholders in Massachusetts and beyond. 
Div. 1979) (“[T]he statutory language embodies a legislative determination that freeze-
out maneuvers in close corporations constitute an abuse of corporate power. Tradi­
tional principles of corporate law, such as the business judgment rule, have failed to 
curb this abuse.  Consequently, actions of close corporations that conform with these 
principles cannot be immune from scrutiny.”); see also Easterbrook & Fischel, supra 
note 11, at 293 (“It makes sense, therefore, to have greater judicial review of termina- R 
tions of managerial (or investing) employees in closely held corporations than would be 
consistent with the business judgment rule.  The same approach could be used with 
salary, dividend, and employment decisions in closely held corporations where the risks 
of conflicts of interest are greater.”). 
When courts suggest that a rejection of business judgment rule deference is war­
ranted, they are presumably contemplating majority decisions that impact the rights of 
individual shareholders.  For more general decisions, such as the choice of one business 
opportunity over another, courts should typically defer to the majority’s prerogatives. 
Cf. James D. Cox, Equal Treatment for Shareholders: An Essay, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 
615, 631 (1997) (“Though great flexibility should be accorded managers on matters re­
lated to the conduct of the corporation’s business, this is not necessarily the case regard­
ing decisions that impact the relative rights of owners’ interests in the firm. The former 
is more clearly the type of business activity which is best lodged with the firm’s manag­
ers; the latter is not.” (footnote omitted)). 
